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Editor’s Note: We invited OIRA director Cass Sunstein
to submit an Another View sidebar, but he declined.
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hen the White House told Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson to stand
down on her plan to issue a new air
quality standard for ozone pollution this past September, President Obama’s point
man was Cass Sunstein, the Harvard Law School
professor who heads the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs. OIRA is a small division inside
the Office of Management and Budget, part of the
executive office of the president. Sunstein’s decision
on ozone means that EPA will have to implement
— and defend in court — a standard promulgated
by the George W. Bush administration that Jackson
called “legally indefensible” a few months earlier.
The decision enraged green groups, a core Democratic constituency. Along with business interests
and many states, all had lobbied EPA on the merits
and the West Wing on the politics with every resource they could muster. The president’s men and
women had spent much of the spring and summer
working hard to nurture business-friendly optics
on regulatory matters. In the final scrum, the environmental community ended up with a thumb
in its eye, as it has whenever the EPA administrator
is overwhelmed by OIRA’s relentless drive to quell
controversial rules going back forty years.
From an historical perspective, Sunstein was
merely continuing an unbroken track record
amassed by OIRA and its predecessors, tracing
back to the Nixon White House. As the ink was
drying on the spate of new environmental statutes
enacted in the progressive salad days of 1970-73,
Richard Nixon’s own point man, Commerce Department Secretary Maurice Stans, persuaded Chief
of Staff John Ehrlichman to initiate a task force that
would monitor the infant EPA’s activities. Gradually expanded to cover all executive branch agencies, and institutionalized by the 1980 Paperwork
Reduction Act and an executive order issued in
the Clinton administration, OIRA has operated in
a remarkably consistent manner ever since, under
Democratic and Republican presidents, through
recessions, boom times, war, and peace, and regardless of how specifically statutory mandates
have instructed agencies what to do. In fact, two
distressing aspects of the ozone decision demonstrate OIRA’s disregard for clear legislative intent:
First, Congress delegated the mandate to issue new
National Ambient Air Quality Standards based on
emerging science directly to the EPA administrator,
not the president. Second, OIRA justified its interCopyright © 2012, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org.
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vention for the sake of reducing regulatory costs,
but the Clean Air Act prohibits Jackson from considering costs when setting NAAQSs — costs come
into play when the NAAQSs are applied to State
Implementation Plans.

S

ix months ago, the Center for Progressive Reform undertook an empirical
study of OIRA’s activities, assembling
an unprecedented portrait of its behavior during the decade from October 16,
2001, when Bush II director John Graham first began to post notices of meetings with outside parties
on the Internet, until June 1, 2011, 28 months into
the Obama administration and Cass Sunstein’s reign
as director. OIRA conducted 6,194 separate reviews
of regulatory submissions, holding 1,080 meetings
that involved 5,759 appearances by outside participants. Both our final
report and the database we
assembled are available on
the CPR website, at progressivereform.org.
OIRA is a surprisingly
small division with a staff of
approximately thirty desk
officers (mostly economists)
who are responsible for reviewing 500 to 700 agency
regulations each year. Executive Order 12,866, issued by President Clinton
in 1993, and continued
by Presidents Bush and
Obama, authorizes it to review “significant regulatory actions” to ensure that they comply with the
central goal of the order: that “the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”
As CPR and others have pointed out in the past,
the analytical tool that OIRA uses to determine a
regulation’s fate, cost-benefit analysis, is structurally
biased to inflate expected costs and trivialize benefits,
often making protective, statutorily mandated regulations appear inordinately expensive if not ridiculous. Some of the future benefits of a regulation (e.g.,
cancers prevented, lives saved) are first converted into
dollar amounts to allow for apples-to-apples comparison with regulatory costs. These benefits are then
discounted to their present values according to standardized annual interest rates (three and seven per-

cent). As a result, future harms to public health or the
environment count for only a fraction of more immediate effects, such as short-term compliance costs
— a normative assumption directly at odds with the
preventive premise of environmental laws. More fundamental than these distortions is the fact that many
expected benefits of a regulation (e.g., neurological
damage, diminished fertility) are simply left out of
the analysis because they are harder to monetize.
The office’s overbearing intervention in regulatory
affairs, especially during the presidencies of Ronald
Reagan and George H. W. Bush, sparked intense
controversy in Congress and in the press, raising
concerns about the separation of powers, the transparency of the review process, and rulemaking delay. Executive Order 12,866 responded to the most
trenchant of these criticisms — OIRA’s penchant for
delaying rules, dragging informal proposals into its
net, and operating behind
closed doors. It sets deadlines, circumscribes the
scope of what the office may
review, and requires broad
disclosure. For example,
the order instructs OIRA
to focus on “economically
significant rules,” generally
defined as rules imposing
more than $100 million in
annual compliance costs. It
allows the office to extend
the scope of its review in
very limited circumstances,
namely when a proposed
rule would interfere with
other agencies’ work; materially change entitlement programs; or present
“novel” legal or policy issues. And it requires that
the office make available “all documents exchanged
between OIRA and the agency during the review
by OIRA,” and that all agencies “identify for the
public those changes in the regulatory action that
were made at the suggestion or recommendation of
OIRA.” The office and the agencies routinely ignore
these unequivocal mandates, and have done so since
the executive order was issued.
OIRA has extended its reach into every corner of
the agencies’ work. Of the approximately 500-700
rules reviewed by the office each year, only about 100
are economically significant; the rest are “non-economically significant,” supposedly a small exception
to the EO’s rule. Or, in other words, non-econom-
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ically significant rules are reviewed at a ratio of six
to one with the rules that EO 12,866 establishes as
the primary focus of OIRA’s work. To make matters
worse, these non-economically significant rules — already on the border of OIRA’s authority and over-selected for review — are also frequently the subject of
meetings between OIRA representatives and outside
lobbyists. Of the 409 rules discussed at such meetings during the period we studied, 248 (61 percent)
were non-economically significant. By micromanaging so many small-scale, routine regulations, the office not only undermines agency prerogatives, it sets
up a dynamic where it can hold minor rules hostage
in exchange for the release of major proposals.
OIRA has adopted perhaps the most extreme
open-door policy in Washington with respect to
rulemaking proposals, agreeing to meet with anyone
who asks for such an audience, whether or not the
originating agency has officially submitted the matter
for review. It insists that it is required by EO 12,866
to sit down with all comers. This assertion is a blatant misreading because nothing in the executive order requires such a policy; it merely requires OIRA
to make certain disclosures when it does meet with
individuals from outside the executive branch.
Equal access to OIRA does not produce balanced
participation. Over the last decade, 65 percent of the
5,759 participants who met with OIRA represented
industry interests — about five times the number
appearing on behalf of public interest groups. President Obama’s OIRA did only somewhat better than
President George W. Bush’s, with a 62 percent industry participation rate to Bush’s 68 percent, and a
16 percent public interest group participation level to
Bush’s 10 percent. Even under this ostensibly transformative president, who pledged to rid his administration of the undue influence of well-heeled lobbyists and conduct government in the open, industry
visits outnumbered public interest visits by a ratio of
almost four to one.
We made a ranked list of the 30 outside organizations that met with OIRA most frequently. Five
were national environmental groups: the Natural Resources Defense Council (ranked 2 overall), Environmental Defense Fund (5), Sierra Club (6), Earthjustice (8), and Consumer Federation of America (30).
Seventeen were large corporations and trade associations, including: the American Chemistry Council
(1), ExxonMobil (3), American Forest and Paper Association (4), American Petroleum Institute (7), Edison Electric Institute (9), American Trucking Associations (12), National Association of Home Builders
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(13), Air Transport Association (15), National Association of Manufacturers (16), National Cattlemen’s
Beef Association (17), and DuPont (19). The remaining eight were law and lobbying firms representing industry viewpoints. Remarkably, among OIRA’s
most persistent guests was the U.S. Small Business
Administration (not an outside organization, hence
not ranked). Its tiny Office of Advocacy, which functions like a trade association perched within the federal government, attended 122 meetings, always on
the side of large industry groups.
The economic incentives driving such participation are skewed toward repetitive presentations on
the same issues, especially in light of industry’s heavy
reliance on lobbying and law firms. With their meters running by the hour, these firms appear as frequently as they can at OIRA, often at the beginning,
middle, and end of a controversial rulemaking. Of
the 905 appearances made by such firms in meetings
with OIRA, 94.3 percent were on behalf of industry
groups, while 2.5 percent were on behalf of public
interest groups.
The most disturbing consequence of industry
dominance of the OIRA process is that only 16
percent of rule reviews that involved meetings with
outside parties garnered participation across the spectrum of interested groups. Seventy-three percent attracted participation only from industry and none
from public interest groups, while 7 percent attracted
participation from public interest groups but not industry: a ratio of more than ten to one in favor of
industry’s unopposed involvement.

P

art of what draws industry groups to
OIRA, but repels public interest groups,
may be the office’s well-earned reputation
as a court of last resort for industry lobbyists who have failed to convince scientific and legal experts at the agencies. Public interest
groups are understandably hesitant to spend their
scarce resources on lobbying OIRA, a forum designed to be unreceptive to their arguments given its
institutional track record as a “check” on “excessive”
regulation and its use of cost-benefit analysis. Some
might have expected OIRA to earn a more neutral
reputation under the Obama administration but,
again, we found only small differences.
How and why does this imbalance arise? The resources of large corporations and national trade associations dwarf those of public interest groups, whose
activities are largely funded by foundation grants and
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individual donations. And every rulemaking ensures
that some affected industry sector will be actively involved due to its self-interest in the outcome, while
public interest groups are bound to be only occasional guests, given the wide range of issues demanding
their attention. With such an uneven playing field,
opening the door to any and all takers, and keeping
it open until they have no more left to say, will inevitably reward those interest groups with the economic
ability and self-interest to take maximum advantage
of the process.
OIRA meetings are redundant of the extensive
opportunities for regulated industries to file comments with EPA and other agencies, to testify at numerous public meetings, and to meet with agency
staff innumerable times, under the Administrative
Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment system. Virtually all the groups meeting with the office will have
already lobbied the agency extensively and will continue to do so after OIRA’s review is over. This kind
of repetitive lobbying wastes government resources
and unnecessarily duplicates notice-and-comment
practices, albeit in a far less transparent setting. Without access to the detailed minutes of these meetings,
or to the communications between OIRA and the
agencies that follow, observers are unable to divine
their significance and impact. Worse still, the minimal meeting information that OIRA posts online is
frustratingly unclear — the groups that attend are
identified by cryptic abbreviations, and the meeting
topics often bear little relation to the title of the rule
discussed.
The office’s scant disclosures indicate only whether it changed an agency’s rule during review, without
specifying the nature or significance of any alterations. Again, this practice directly violates the transparency mandates of EO 12,866. Necessarily relying on this unsatisfying data, we found that OIRA
changed 76 percent of rules submitted to it for review
under Obama, compared to a 64 percent change rate
under George W. Bush. EPA rules were changed at
a significantly higher rate (84 percent) than those of
other agencies (65 percent) throughout the period of
our study. And rules that were the subject of meetings with stakeholders were 29 percent more likely
to be changed than those that were not, although the
difference is not as severe under Obama — mainly
because OIRA has been changing more rules even
without meetings than it did under Bush, thus narrowing the gap.
The extent to which the meetings drive the outcomes of OIRA reviews is an open question, one that

is virtually impossible to study on a large scale given
the office’s limited disclosures. But in a forum that
is biased against regulation and highly sensitive to
political pressure, groups that dominate the process
seem most likely to prevail, especially because their
message systematically bypasses statutorily mandated
evaluations by an agency’s scientists, engineers, lawyers, and other technical experts.
Take, for instance, OIRA’s reliance on industrysupplied estimates of technology costs and expected
market effects. In its review of EPA’s proposal to
regulate coal ash, after 33 meetings with industry
representatives OIRA bought their argument that
the most effective regulatory option would impose
a ruinous “stigma” on the beneficial recycling of coal
ash. At the same time, EPA reported that in decades
of implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the agency had never observed such an
effect. Nevertheless, the revised cost-benefit analysis
that emerged from OIRA review predicted that a
stigma effect would result in $233.5 billion in “negative benefits” (i.e., costs) to society. The weaker regulatory alternatives were thus presented as the only
cost-effective options.
Other notable examples where industry achieved
its desired result from lobbying OIRA include:
EPA’s final rule on industrial and commercial boilers,
which will cost industry half as much as the proposed
rule and provide reduced protection, and the agency’s
proposed lead paint rule, whose key testing provision
was eliminated following a successful lobbying effort
by the home renovation industry.

W

hen centralized regulatory review
began in the Nixon White House,
it targeted the newly created EPA.
In the four decades since, OIRA has
steadily expanded its authority over
all executive agencies and even begun an initiative a
few months ago to pull independent agencies like the
Federal Trade Commission into its cost-benefit dragnet. Nevertheless, OIRA remains obsessed with EPA:
fully 442 of OIRA’s 1,080 meetings over the 10-year
period of our study dealt with EPA rules. The agency
submitted only 11 percent of the rulemaking matters
reviewed by OIRA, and yet its rules accounted for 41
percent of all meetings held. This preoccupation was
virtually the same across the Bush and Obama years
(a ratio of 3.6 to 1 in both cases). Only two other
agencies had more than 100 meetings about their
rules: the Department of Health and Human Ser-
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vices (137 meetings) and the Department of Transportation (118 meetings).
Executive Order 12,866 grants OIRA 90 days to
review a regulatory action from the date the originating agency submits it. This period can be extended
by 30 days once, for a total of 120 days, but only
if the agency head agrees to the longer period. Of
the 501 completed reviews in which outside parties
lobbied OIRA, 59 reviews (12 percent) lasted longer
than 120 days and 22 (four percent) extended beyond 180 days.
These delays permit ongoing hazards to go unabated on a daily basis. Among recent examples of
such delays: EPA’s proposed coal ash rule was held
captive at OIRA for six months; a non-economically
significant proposal to issue a “chemicals of concern”
list has languished at OIRA for 20 months at press
time; a rule on cattle feed standards was stalled at
OIRA for 172 days, at which point it was released
only because South Korea insisted on such regulation
before it would lift trade restrictions on U.S. beef;
and child labor rules for agricultural facilities gathered dust for nine months — only the outcry over
grievous injuries suffered by two Oklahoma teenagers dislodged it.
All the above findings are compounded by OIRA’s
early interference in the formulation of regulatory
policy. Of the 1,056 meetings that took place over
the studied time period and that were identified with
a rulemaking stage, 452 (43 percent) took place before the agency’s proposal was even released to the
public. The percentage of meetings that occurred at
this pre-proposal stage has actually been greater during the Obama administration (47 percent) than it
was during the Bush II administration (39 percent).
Early interference frustrates transparency and maintenance of a level playing field because the public sees
the agency’s proposal only after it has been reshaped
by lobbyists and OIRA economists. It also exposes
agencies to White House political pressure before
they have even had the opportunity to seek public
comment on more stringent proposals.
Transparency and accountability reach their alltime nadir when OIRA conducts “informal reviews”
of agency rules. These informal reviews, conducted
through phone calls and meetings between OIRA
and agency staff, are very effective in changing the
agency’s regulatory plans. But the public has virtually no way of knowing what happens during these
reviews, or even how long they last. Of the 1,057
meetings that could be linked to a formal review period, 251 (24 percent) were held prior to the formal
review. To the Obama administration’s credit, the
proportion of informal-review meetings was much
greater under the Bush II administration (34 percent
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of all meetings) than it has been over the last two and
a half years (10 percent).

T

he Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs habitually stretches its authority and
violates its obligations under EO 12,866.
Such casual disregard for an executive order
with bipartisan support — it has been adopted by the Bush and Obama administrations after
being promulgated by President Clinton — should
be offensive on a bipartisan basis, regardless of how
one feels about particular regulatory disputes. By allowing political considerations to trump expert judgments, OIRA distorts regulatory outcomes in favor
of its most active lobbyists: regulated industries seeking to eviscerate pending rules, no matter the cost
to public health or the environment, and the law
firms and lobbyists that represent them. The wellestablished modes of advocacy in environmental law
— based on knowledge of intricate statutory frameworks, scientific expertise, and familiarity with the
scope of the EPA’s delegated authority — are reduced
to nothing more than an elaborate charade, with the
real decisions being made for altogether political reasons.
OIRA’s deeply rooted dysfunctions require nothing less than a fundamental overhaul. The office
should not review individual regulatory proposals.
Instead, its focus should be redirected toward crosscutting regulatory problems that require coordinated
action by multiple agencies. By helping to enhance
the agencies’ administrative and legislative effectiveness, and advocating targeted budget increases to
enable the agencies to enforce existing laws, OIRA
could redefine itself as a key player in stemming regulatory failures rather than a hostile gatekeeper on the
wrong side of history.
But given the Obama administration’s track record
on OIRA, we have little hope that such fundamental
reforms will be contemplated. The least that can be
done is to rein OIRA in and make it comply with its
responsibilities under EO 12,866. The requirements
for transparency and accountability should cover all
written communication between OIRA staff and the
originating agency. The office should terminate its
practice of meeting with any and all outside parties,
repetitively. And if OIRA continues to meet with
outside parties, it must assume an active role in balancing the participation, by consolidating meetings
with like-minded participants — seeing them all at
once and only once — and reaching out to relevant
public interest groups to encourage their input. These
reforms are inadequate, but would at least eliminate
blatant violations of EO 12,866. •
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